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I n the early 1980s, a trio of prominent papers laid out a scathing critique of contemporary econometric practice. In “Macroeconomics and Reality,” Christopher Sims (1980) argued that the “incredible” exclusion restrictions 
used to estimate standard large macroeconometric models undercut the reliability 
of policy advice based on those models; he endorsed instead using as few identi-
fying assumptions as possible and proposed vector autoregressions as an alternative 
modeling strategy. In his inaugural lecture at the London School of Economics, 
“Econometrics: Alchemy or Science?” David Hendry (1980) recited a lengthy list 
of pitfalls of regression studies, most of which can be interpreted in current termi-
nology as threats to the identifi cation of the effect of interest; he then sketched how 
research can be conducted using a minimum of identifying restrictions and ended 
up with what can be seen in retrospect as an error-correction/cointegration model 
of money demand.1 In “Let’s Take the Con Out of Econometrics,” Edward Leamer 
(1983) attacked both the “whimsical” nature of the assumptions used to justify infer-
ences in econometric regression studies using observational data and the fragility 
of results to arbitrary decisions about choice of control variables; he then proposed 
extreme bounds analysis as a tool for quantifying the sensitivity of regression 
1 In an error-correction model, the change in a time-series variable depends on the lagged gap 
between the levels of that variable and one or more other variables; this gap is the “error correction” 
term. As an aside, around the time of Hendry’s lecture Clive Granger set out to prove such models 
were internally inconsistent but in fact proved the opposite, and his resulting characterization of such 
processes, which he called “co-integrated,” ultimately won him the 2003 Nobel Prize in Economics 
(Granger, 2003).
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estimates. These three articles targeted different audiences and proposed quite 
different techniques for solving their perceived defi ciencies in current practice. 
But they shared the same core message: far more attention needed to be paid to 
identifi cation of the causal effect of interest, and econometric inference should not 
hinge on subsidiary modeling assumptions.
These two objectives—fi rst, credible identifi cation of key causal effects or 
parameters, and second, statistical inference that is robust to subsidiary modeling 
assumptions—have guided much of applied and theoretical econometric research 
since these three papers. In hindsight, this trio’s critiques were on target. Moreover, 
while there have inevitably been some false turns and dead ends, the applied and 
theoretical econometric research fl owing in part from those papers has produced 
important advances that serve to make empirical work today far more credible than 
it was three decades ago.
The combined effect of this research has been to transform econometric prac-
tice and teaching—in my view, very much for the better. A modern undergraduate 
course in econometrics looks and feels very different than it did 20 or even ten 
years ago. In the 1980s, the standard undergraduate curriculum addressed estima-
tion and inference in models in which all regressors were treated symmetrically. In 
contrast, the classroom today focuses more on the estimation of specifi c objects, 
mainly specifi c causal effects, and less on the estimation of “models.” For example, 
last spring I supervised an undergraduate senior thesis with the goal of estimating 
the effect of steroids on home runs in Major League Baseball (a tricky task, since 
we don’t have player-level medical test data on steroid use); 20 years ago, the goal 
might have been to develop a model of home runs. The difference in emphasis—a 
specifi c causal effect instead of “estimating a model”—refl ects a helpful narrowing 
of scope that makes one focus on the key sources of identifi cation.
Angrist and Pischke’s article (this issue) highlights one aspect of the fi rst of these 
two research strands listed above—specifi cally, the rise of experiments and quasi-
experiments as credible sources of identifi cation in microeconometric studies, which 
they usefully term “design-based research.” But in so doing, they miss an important 
part of the story: the second research strand aimed at developing tools for inference 
that are robust to subsidiary modeling assumptions. My fi rst aim in these remarks 
therefore is to highlight some key developments in the second research strand. I then 
turn to Angrist and Pischke’s call for adopting experiments and quasi-experiments 
in macroeconometrics; while sympathetic, I suspect the scope for such studies is 
limited. I conclude with some observations on the current debate about whether 
experimental methods have gone too far in abandoning economic theory.
Credible Inference
The past three decades have seen signifi cant changes in the tools of economet-
rics, many motivated by a desire to minimize the effect of “whimsical” assumptions on 
inference about the object of interest. By “whimsical” I mean arbitrary assumptions 
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that are subsidiary to the empirical purpose at hand, but which affect inference 
about the causal effect of interest.2 The new tools provide reliable inference without 
implausible subsidiary assumptions. I illustrate this by four examples: robust stan-
dard errors, methods for inference with weak instruments, handling of control 
variables, and nonparametric and semiparametric regression.
Robust Standard Errors
The standard errors conventionally provided in an ordinary least squares 
regression analysis are based on the assumption that the error term in the regres-
sion is homoskedastic, that is, has a variance that does not depend on the regressors 
and is the same for all observations. When this assumption is violated, heteroske-
dasticity arises, in which case the estimated regression coeffi cients are unaffected 
but the standard errors and statistical signifi cance are unreliable.
The 1970s procedure for handling potential heteroskedasticity was either to 
ignore it or to test for it, to model the variance as a function of the regressors, 
and then to use weighted least squares. While in theory weighted least squares 
can yield more statistically effi cient estimators, modeling heteroskedasticity in a 
multiple regression context is diffi cult, and statistical inference about the effect of 
interest becomes hostage to the required subsidiary modeling assumptions. White’s 
(1980) important paper showed how to get valid standard errors whether there is 
heteroskedasticity or not, without modeling the heteroskedasticity. This paper had 
a tremendous impact on econometric practice: today, the use of heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors is standard, and one rarely sees weighted least squares used 
to correct for heteroskedasticity.
The widespread adoption of heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors has 
also alleviated one of the more awkward moments in introductory undergraduate 
econometrics: when the teacher defi nes “homoskedasticity”; explains that we will 
assume it for now, though it isn’t really true, of course; and promises to deal with 
this later in the semester. In the circa-1980 textbooks, the assumption of homoske-
dasticity was “relaxed” in a later chapter using weighted least squares (for examples 
of three leading books at the time, see Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981; Gujarati, 1978; 
Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1979). Today, there is no need to introduce the assump-
tion of homoskedasticity in the fi rst place: one can simply follow common practice 
and use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors from the outset.
Work on robust inference is ongoing, and there have been recent important 
developments in robust standard errors for panel data regression. In panel data, 
the errors for a given entity (individual) might be serially correlated, and if so, 
then conventional ordinary least squares standard errors are unreliable. Bertrand, 
Dufl o, and Mullainathan (2004) brought this problem to the attention of the 
2 Here is Leamer’s (1983, pp. 37–38) defi nition of whimsical: “Sometimes I take the error terms to 
be correlated, sometimes uncorrelated; sometimes normal and sometimes nonnormal; sometimes I 
include observations from the decade of the fi fties, sometimes I exclude them; sometimes the equation 
is linear and sometimes nonlinear; sometimes I control for variable z, sometimes I don’t.”
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applied community by demonstrating, in an empirically motivated Monte Carlo 
study, that conventional ordinary least squares standard errors for fi xed effects 
regression can substantially understate the sampling uncertainty. In panel data, if 
the errors are uncorrelated across entities, then inference that is robust to general 
heteroskedasticity and to serial correlation within an entity can be conducted using 
“clustered” standard errors, where in this case the entity is the “cluster.” It has been 
known for some time that clustered standard errors are consistent under potential 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity if the number of clusters (entities) is large 
and the number of observations per cluster (time periods) is small (Kiefer, 1980; 
Arrelano, 1987, 2003). But recent work by Hansen (2007) has shown that, surpris-
ingly, valid inference remains possible with general serial correlation even if the 
number of time periods is large and the number of entities small. Even though the 
variance is imprecisely estimated in this case, t- and F -statistics have simple distri-
butions, so hypothesis tests and confi dence intervals based on clustered standard 
errors remain valid as long as one uses the right critical values (t- and F -tables with 
additional degrees-of-freedom adjustments).3
Inference with Possibly Weak Instruments
One hallmark of the new design-based research advocated by Angrist and 
Pischke is close scrutiny of proposed instrumental variables so that they do in fact 
provide credible identifi cation. The question of whether instruments plausibly 
capture truly exogenous variation—variation unrelated to the error in the regres-
sion of interest—is at center stage. One unintended consequence of this focus on 
credibly exogenous variation is that, in many applications, these instrumental 
variables are found to have a weak correlation with the included endogenous 
regressors for which they are instruments, conditional on the control variables. This 
weak correlation raises technical problems for conducting statistical inference; in 
particular, the usual textbook asymptotic normal and chi-squared distributions of 
instrumental variable regression statistics can in this case provide poor approxima-
tions to sampling distributions, even if the sample size is large.
Fortunately, econometric theorists have been working hard on this so-called 
weak instruments problem and have developed a suite of tools for inference in 
instrumental variables regression (and generalized method of moments estima-
tion) when the instruments are possibly weak. Some of these tools are becoming 
suffi ciently well-accepted that they are commonplace in empirical work published 
in top journals and are starting to appear in undergraduate textbooks. The simplest 
of these tools is to look at the fi rst-stage F -statistic—that is, the F -statistic testing 
3 Hansen’s (2007) result is akin to the notion that in fi nite samples with normally distributed data, 
valid hypothesis tests and confi dence intervals can be constructed using the t-distribution, even 
though the error variance is not consistently estimated. Hansen’s result applies to a balanced panel 
with independence across entities and allows for general serial correlation and heteroskedasticity that 
has the same form across entities. These assumptions are appropriate if the entities are drawn using 
simple random sampling. Ibragimov and Müller (forthcoming) provide a different approach to robust 
inference in panel data that relaxes the assumption of homogeneity across entities.
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the hypothesis that the coeffi cients on the instruments are zero in the fi rst-stage 
regression of two-stage least squares. If this F -statistic is large—a common rule of 
thumb is F > 10—then one can treat the instruments as suffi ciently strong that the 
usual two-stage least squares output can be used.
If the fi rst-stage F -statistic is small, however, then two-stage least squares can be 
badly biased and the accompanying confi dence intervals can be quite misleading 
(typically, too short and centered in the wrong place—a bad combination!). The 
econometric literature on what to do if you have weak instruments is large and 
there is not room here to do it justice, so I mention only two developments. First, a 
remarkable result in this recent literature on weak instruments is that, if you have 
a single included endogenous regressor, Moreira’s (2003) conditional likelihood 
ratio statistic effectively produces valid and fully effi cient confi dence intervals and 
hypothesis tests regardless of whether instruments are weak, strong, or even irrel-
evant. Second, one estimation method that performs better than two-stage least 
squares when instruments are weak is limited information maximum likelihood 
(LIML), although LIML can produce extreme estimates. Commands for inference 
in instrumental variable regression with possibly weak instruments are increasingly 
available in statistical software packages; for example, fi rst-stage F -statistics, condi-
tional likelihood ratio statistic confi dence intervals, and the LIML estimator are 
readily computed in STATA.
Control Variables
Another awkward moment in undergraduate instruction comes when a clever 
undergraduate asks why we are interpreting the coeffi cient on the variable of 
interest as causal, but not the coeffi cients on the control variables. After all, doesn’t 
the error term have (by assumption) conditional mean zero? For example, we know 
that primary school test scores are determined by many factors, some of which are 
diffi cult to measure, such as time spent by parents helping with homework and 
stability of family life. Some of these unmeasured factors are arguably correlated 
with class size in the United States because of local school funding. To control 
for these omitted factors, we include socioeconomic indicators, such as district 
income, in a regression of test scores on class size. Does it make any sense to think 
of the coeffi cient on class size as causal, but not the coeffi cient on district income? 
The research on experiments and quasi-experiments has, as a side benefi t, 
spurred more precise thinking about control variables among econometricians. 
Consider the linear regression model with n observations on a dependent variable 
Y, a regressor of interest X, a control variable W, and error term u:
Y = β0 + β1 X + β 2 W + u .
The standard textbook assumption justifying ordinary least squares, then and now, 
is that, given the regressors, the errors have mean zero; that is, E(u | X, W ) = 0. 
Under this assumption, the ordinary least squares estimator is unbiased for both 
coeffi cients, so both coeffi cients should have causal interpretations. But as the class 
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size example makes clear, the control variable W (for example, district income) 
proxies for deeper unmodeled effects remaining in the error term (for example, 
parental time spent helping with homework), so the control variable W is corre-
lated with the error term u—indeed, that is why the control variable W is included 
in the fi rst place. In other words, the key identifi cation assumption in the clas-
sical linear regression model, that the error term has a conditional mean of zero, 
E(u | X, W ) = 0, does not plausibly apply when W is a control variable.
The experiment/quasi-experiment literature has adopted assumptions that 
make the distinction between variables of interest and control variables precise 
and interpretable, and which provide a satisfying answer to our student’s hard 
question. One precise defi nition of a control variable W is that, once it is included 
in the regression, the conditional mean of u does not depend on X ; that is, 
E(u | X, W ) = E(u | W ). Under this “conditional mean independence” assumption, 
the coeffi cient on X is unbiased and consistent, but the coeffi cient on W is not. 
Said differently, the coeffi cient on X can be given a causal interpretation, but the 
coeffi cient on W cannot.
Like heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered standard errors, 
and some methods for inference with weak instruments, conditional mean inde-
pendence has made it into modern introductory undergraduate textbooks (for 
example, Stock and Watson, 2007, pp. 478–80). While the concept of conditional 
mean independence is not strictly a tool (for example, it is not a command or option 
in STATA), the shift toward the conditional mean independence assumption has 
helpfully served to focus attention on measuring a single effect well instead of the 
vaguer goal of “developing a model of Y.” This assumption also provides a fruitful 
framework for thinking about regression specifi cation: what control variables do 
you need so that once you condition on W, it is “as if ” X is randomly assigned?
Nonparametric and Semiparametric Methods
Econometricians in the early 1980s knew that parametric (typically linear) 
functional forms were not always a good approximation. Over the past quarter 
century, theoretical statisticians and econometricians have worked to develop less 
restrictive approaches to functional form issues. The result is a well-developed 
literature on nonparametric and semiparametric estimation. Semiparametric 
inference is particularly relevant since it focuses on obtaining credible estimates 
of a specifi c effect of interest while making very weak subsidiary functional form 
assumptions (such as how the control variables enter the regression).
Unlike the previous three examples, nonparametric methods have not made 
it into undergraduate econometrics textbooks. Nonparametric regression is 
not hard to explain at an intuitive level: kernel regression entails computing a 
weighted average of Y for observations i with X i close to some specifi c point x, 
thereby estimating E(Y | X = x) without imposing a functional form. But nonpara-
metric methods require large data sets so that there are enough observations 
close to x to provide a meaningful local average, for all x in the range of the 
bulk of the data. Although nonparametric and semiparametric methods are 
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being found increasingly in the program evaluation literature, their use remains 
specialized and relatively rare.
Identifi cation in Macroeconometrics
I now turn to Angrist and Pischke’s challenge that macroeconometricians 
adopt design-based research. I agree with their suggestion, despite suspecting that 
it will not take us very far.
Broadly, there are three classes of questions of interest in macroeconometrics. 
First, why do we observe the specifi c macroeconomic dynamics that actually occur? 
This class of questions typically has to do with the estimation of parameters of 
structural models. Second, what are the effects on macroeconomic dynamics of 
changes in rules, institutions, and preferences? An example would be to estimate 
the effect of changing some of those parameters, say from an accommodative set 
of Taylor rule coeffi cients for monetary policy to an anti-infl ationary set of coef-
fi cients, as many have argued happened when Paul Volcker was chairman of the 
Federal Reserve in the early 1980s.4 Finally, what are the effects of autonomous 
shocks or one-off policy interventions within the context of existing institutions 
and policy rules? An example of this fi nal class is estimating the effect of an unan-
ticipated policy deviation from the Taylor rule, say an unexpected autonomous 
increase in the federal funds interest rate by 25 basis points.
Effects of Shocks
Design-based research in the spirit of Angrist and Pischke’s essay is arguably 
best-suited for questions in the third category—that is, questions that investigate 
the effects of shocks or policy interventions. As an example, consider the current 
debate over the effect on output of fi scal stimulus. Johnson, Parker, and Souleles 
(2006) use a quasi-experiment to provide an econometrically clean set of estimates 
of the dynamic spending pattern, at the individual level, associated with the 2001 
one-time federal income tax rebate. Their study exploits random variation in 
the timing of mailing of rebate checks to disentangle rebate-induced spending 
changes from macroeconomic factors that affect spending. Specifi cally, not all the 
rebate checks could be physically printed and mailed at once, so they were mailed 
using an algorithm based on the second-to-last digit of Social Security numbers. 
They fi nd that approximately two-thirds of a rebate check is spent after six months, 
which is a large fraction from the perspective of the permanent income hypothesis, 
but still less than the rebate itself. But their study only captures the fi rst round of 
the multiplier effect, so to speak, which illustrates one limitation of design-based 
research in macroeconomics—the inability to estimate general equilibrium effects 
4 A Taylor (1993) rule for monetary policy specifi es how a central bank should or does change the 
nominal interest rate in response to divergences from the bank’s target rate of infl ation and from 
potential GDP.
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using individual-level data. To estimate general equilibrium effects, one needs 
known random or as-if random macroeconomic shocks along with data tracking 
the effect of those shocks on the economy.
A different approach therefore is to use as-if random macro-scale variation in 
a policy variable—a macroeconomic quasi-experiment—as an instrumental vari-
able. In an application to monetary policy, for example, one can imagine an ideal 
quasi-experiment: the Federal Open Market Committee decides on a 25 basis point 
increase, a telex is sent to the New York desk, but there is a typo so the desk instead 
increases rates by 250 basis points, an error that isn’t caught for a month. Suppose 
these typos occur every now and then, yet are always surprising, so we get repeats 
of the experiment. Voila, we have a great instrument, the 225 basis point mistakes 
(unrelated to economic activity, strongly related to the actual federal funds rate)! The 
“patient,” the U.S. economy, is assumed to be stationary, so data on these repeated 
quasi-experiments can be used to estimate the same coeffi cients. Sadly (at least for 
econometricians), this quasi-experiment is unavailable. In their path-breaking work, 
Romer and Romer (1989) looked for the next-best thing by reading the minutes of 
the Federal Open Market Committee to fi nd exogenous variation in monetary policy 
shocks. This work pioneered the quasi-experiment approach in macroeconometrics 
by bringing information outside the model to bear on shock identifi cation, but it also 
remains controversial because of the many detailed judgments that must be made 
when deciding which monetary policy moves really were exogenous.
Several papers use a quasi-experiment approach to identify dynamic causal 
effects of fi scal policy shocks. Romer and Romer (2007) use a series derived by 
reading texts related to tax law changes to construct a measure of exogenous varia-
tion. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey (2009) focus on government defi cit 
shocks induced by wars: if (as they argue) the wars occur for reasons unrelated to 
other shocks or economic events, then they are valid instruments for estimation 
of dynamic causal effects of government spending on output, infl ation, and other 
macroeconomic indicators. The advantage of this approach is that the estimated 
multipliers incorporate general equilibrium effects. However, this macro quasi-
experiment approach is not as clean as its microeconometric counterpart; for 
example, Ramey (2009) shows that results are sensitive to whether one considers 
the exogenous variation to be a change in expected future spending or the subse-
quent spending change itself.
Rigobon’s (2003) and Rigobon–Sack’s (2003, 2004) scheme for identifi cation 
of shocks by breaks in variances in a vector autoregression can be viewed as another 
example of quasi-experiment methods in econometrics: if the variance of the struc-
tural shocks change, but the equations linking those shocks to observed macro 
variables do not, then under certain conditions the coeffi cients are identifi ed. This 
idea laudably exploits variation outside of the model for identifi cation, but if the vari-
ance changes are small, it shares (in a complicated way) the weak-instrument pitfall 
of microeconometric design-based research. Moreover, this scheme requires an 
assumption that in some applications seems heroic (for example, only shock variances 
changed, not Taylor rule coeffi cients, in the transition to the Great Moderation).
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Another structural vector autoregression identifi cation scheme, a logical 
extension of Sims’s call for using minimal a priori theoretical restrictions, is Faust’s 
(1998) and Uhlig’s (2005) idea of obtaining identifi cation by imposing sign restric-
tions on dynamic causal effects (in the jargon of vector autoregressions, on “impulse 
response functions”). These restrictions are stunningly minimal. For example, an 
entire analysis might rely on the assertion that contractionary monetary policy 
is contractionary, at least in the short to medium run—that is, macroeconomics, 
despite its shortcomings, gets the sign right, at least at the two-year horizon. One 
might think that such a minimal restriction would yield little of use, but if it is 
repeated often enough (applied to many series) this can restrict the family of allow-
able impulse response functions to a workably small set (for example, see Ahmadi 
and Uhlig, 2009). This line of research confronts considerable technical hurdles 
(for example, see Moon, Schorfheide, Granziera, and Lee, 2009), and there are as 
yet few applications, but it is a creative approach that pushes forward identifi cation 
in macroeconometrics using a minimum of subsidiary assumptions.
The Effect of Changing Rules and the Estimation of Structural Parameters
Many important macroeconomic policy debates are about rules and institu-
tions, not shocks, and learning the effect on economic performance of changing a 
rule or institution is at least as important as tracing the dynamic effect of an unex-
pected shock. For example, should the Fed adopt an explicit infl ation-targeting 
policy? What are the macro consequences of changes in the tax system, or of 
proposed fi nancial system reforms? Unfortunately, the scope for quasi-experiments 
in estimating the effect of changing rules or institutions is much more limited 
than for estimating the effect of shocks. It is hard to imagine a real-world quasi-
experiment in which a central bank changed its monetary policy rule for reasons 
not rooted in prior macroeconomic conditions and expectations of macroeco-
nomic benefi ts that would fl ow from the change. This is not to say that we cannot 
learn from history; in fact, historical studies can usefully incorporate regression 
analysis to provide concise summaries of relations among multiple macro variables. 
Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999) provide a good example of an 
informative historical study of cross-country variation in monetary policy institu-
tions (with a focus on the policy of infl ation targeting), along with what happened 
after countries changed their institutions—in effect, a differences-in-differences 
design. But we should not be overly optimistic that the coeffi cients arising from 
such studies will have a clean causal interpretation.
The role for quasi-experiments in the estimation of structural parameters is 
probably even more limited. These parameters largely need to be estimated by 
exploiting time series variation in macroeconomic quantities using model-based 
identifi cation. Even so, some of the technical developments arising from the reac-
tion to the Sims/Hendry/Leamer critiques can inform and contribute to this 
work. In particular, estimation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models 
is known to be plagued by complicated versions of the weak instruments problem, 
and there is active and much-needed work on conditions for identifi cation and on 
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inference in these kinds of models that is robust to weak instruments (Komunjer 
and Ng, 2009; Guerron-Quintana, Inoue, and Kilian, 2009).
Concluding Remarks
The developments spurred by the Sims/Hendry/Leamer trio of papers have 
been important and valuable and have made applied econometric research more 
credible and infl uential today than it was 30 years ago. This progress has stemmed 
both from attention to core identifi cation issues—exploiting credible sources of 
exogeneity, as in experiments and quasi-experiments—and to technical work in 
the econometric trenches by theorists laboring to minimize the impact of “whim-
sical” subsidiary modeling assumptions on statistical inference.
I agree with the theme of Angrist and Pischke that the rise of true experiments 
in econometrics and a deepened understanding of experimental design and pitfalls 
has been an unexpected and welcome development. Hendry and Leamer spoke 
highly of experiments in the early 1980s, but their focus on ways to improve the 
credibility of observational studies suggests that they did not expect experiments to 
play much of a role in econometric research. As it turned out, however, public agen-
cies and private companies have proven increasingly willing to support randomized 
experiments. When well done, experiments elucidate the specifi c problems under 
study and also can provide economic lessons beyond the problem at hand.
Looking for sources of credible identifi cation outside the confi nes of a narrow 
economic model has also been highly fruitful. An example of a successful quasi-exper-
imental study is Madrian and Shea (2001), who found that 401(k) retirement accounts 
in which contributions were made unless the participant actively chose to opt-out had 
much higher take-up rates than 401(k)s in which no contributions were made unless 
the participants actively chose to opt-in. Indeed, this paper was part of the intellectual 
case that led to changing U.S. pension laws in the Pension Protection Act of 2006 
to encourage default opt-out plans while allowing workers to continue to be able to 
choose their contributions to such accounts. Their study also provided support for 
behavioral economic models of procrastination or avoidance of complexity as many 
workers simply chose the default option, whether it was opt-in or opt-out. Again, when 
done well, quasi-experiments inform both the specifi c question under study and the 
broader corpus of economic knowledge.
I would further suggest that the rise of experiments and quasi-experiments 
has had a salutary effect on how we teach and evaluate empirical research in 
economics. The ideas behind internal and external validity have been present in 
economics for years, but adopting that terminology (which economists did not 
invent) and tapping into the thinking of statisticians on this topic has helped to 
organize the conduct and evaluation of empirical work in economics. The presence 
of some well-done randomized experiments allows economists to compare obser-
vational and experimental methods, and I would argue that at least in some cases 
the observational methods come off looking good. For example, in the question 
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of how class size affects academic performance, observational regression studies 
using a rich set of control variables reach quantitatively similar conclusions to 
those found in the Tennessee Project STAR class size experiment. This suggests 
that Lalonde’s (1986) negative conclusions about observational studies, which he 
drew after fi nding that econometric models estimated using observational data on 
job training programs failed to accord with reliable experimental evidence, should 
not be over-generalized.
The debate on whether the experimental and quasi-experimental approach 
in microeconometrics has gone too far is an interesting and important one, and 
I would have liked to have seen Angrist and Pischke engage it further. There is 
not space here to recapitulate this debate, but I do encourage interested readers 
to pursue it by reading the critics, in particular Deaton (2009) and Heckman and 
Urzua (2009), and the rejoinder to Deaton by Imbens (2009).
■ I thank Guido Imbens, Michael Kremer, and Mark Watson for helpful conversations. This 
work was funded in part by NSF grant SBR-0617811.
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